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A different concept of the private sector, a 
different concept of the public sector 
(Notes for a Latin American debate) 
Aníbal Quijano* 
At a meeting held in honour of the memory of 
José Medina Echavarria, it seems appropriate to 
begin our conversation concerning the role of 
ideas by relating an anecdote about this great 
man. At some point in the late 1970s, I once ran 
into him as, with a disgruntled look on his face, 
he was leaving a discussion held at ECLAC. 
"How's it going, don José?", I asked him in 
greeting. "Oh, these people", he sighed. "Do you 
know what they have just said? That we should 
come up with new ideas. What do you think of 
that? Just coming up with ideas of any sort is 
difficult enough..." 
Accustomed as he was to dealing in the 
realm of ideas, he knew what he was talking 
about. He produced them, and k is to him that 
we owe many of the ideas which continue to 
inspire us as we strive to understand and change 
our society. It is for this reason that, as we open a 
new round of discussions concerning the future 
of Latin America, nothing could be more 
appropriate than to take some of his ideas as a 
starting point. 
Latin America has been under pressure to "mod-
ernize" throughout most of this century, but this 
pressure has been particularly strong and has 
been marked by a number of quite distinctive 
characteristics since the end of the Second World 
War. Firstly, this pressure has, to a large extent, 
'Former Social Affairs Officer of the Social Development 
Division of liCI.AC 
Emphasis has been placed during this meet-
ing on Medina Echavarria's view of Latin Amer-
ica as part of Western culture, as well as on his 
idea that one of the strongest links between the 
two is the struggle to attain modernity. For 
Medina, however, this was a particular type of 
modernity, one governed by an historical rather 
than an instrumental line of reasoning. And, as 
he himself stated, in Latin America this must, 
above all, be the result of an "effort to re-work 
and re-build", which must be made under condi-
tions entirely different from those of the past. 
I believe that using these ideas as a starting 
point may be a productive way to go about our 
work here. And along these lines, one of the 
most important issues to consider is that of the 
relationship between Latin America and moder-
nity, because this relationship involves certain 
elements which can play a pivotal role in formu-
lating a Latin American response to a number of 
pressing problems that affect not only this but 
other parts of the world as well. 
been exerted by non-Latin American —or, if you 
will, external— agents acting in theirown inter-
ests. Secondly, it has taken the form of proposals 
that the region should make itself fully receptive 
to the mode of production, consumption patt-
erns, culture, and the social and political forms of 
organization of the developed capitalist coun-
tries, which are regarded as paradigms of a suc-
cessful "modernization" effort. In practice, what 
the region is being urged to do is to make 
I 
Modernity and "modernization" in Latin America 
106 CEPAL REVIEW No. 35 / August 1988 
changes so as to adapt to the requirements of 
capitalism as it approaches a mature stage of 
inter- or trans-nationality. 
Following the Second World War, the core 
elements of the historical rationale of modernity 
were in a weakened state, and modernity as such 
was in crisis as a result of the fierce attacks 
launched against it by malignant political forces 
that appealed to mankind's irrational side. An 
effort had been made to beguile the people into a 
cult of power by presenting the unashamed use 
of naked force as its most attractive legitimizing 
feature. These forces, such as Nazism, had been 
soundly defeated in the war; but after this expe-
rience, after Auschwitz, the promises of moder-
nity would never again —as Medina Echavarria 
observed— be taken up "with the enthusiasm 
and hopefulness of days gone by". Moreover, this 
experience surely consolidated the present reign 
of the instrumental rationale, which now 
—vying against the historical rationale— lays 
claim to the prestige and lustre of the title of 
modernity. And it should also be pointed out that 
at that time it was still not clear —nor was it an 
accepted fact for many people— that this reign 
was to encompass not only the so-called Western 
world, but the world forged under Stalinism as 
well. 
At this point, I believe it is necessary to 
examine two of the implications that these pro-
cesses had for Latin America. Firstly, because 
"modernization" came late to our shores as a 
foreign import already formed and practised, an 
idea took hold in the region which continues to 
hold many of us in its thrall: that Latin America 
has always been no more than a passive and 
belated "receptor" of modernity. The second, 
which is implicit in the first, is the habit of 
confusing modernity with "modernization". 
The concept of modernity as a category was 
surely developed in Europe, particularly from 
the eighteenth century onward. Nevertheless, it 
was an outgrowth of a series of changes which 
began to occur in the late fifteenth century 
throughout the whole of that part of the world 
which was subject to European rule. The intel-
lectual processing of these changes, however, 
revolved around Europe, in keeping with its 
central and dominant position within that 
aggregate of nations. 
The starting point for the formation of this 
new historical aggregate, within whose context 
"modernity" as such was to arise, was the con-
quest of what was later to be known as Latin 
America and its incorporation into the European 
sphere of domination. In other words, the pro-
cess by which modernity came about bears a 
direct and essential relationship to the historical 
establishment of Latin America. The reference 
here is not confined solely to the well-known fact 
that the output, primarily of metals, of America 
was one of the basic originating factors in capital 
accumulation, nor to the fact that the conquest of 
America was the first step in the formation of 
the world market, even though this market was 
the real-life context within which capitalism and 
its worldwide logic were to emerge as the mate-
rial foundations for European modernity. 
For Europe, the conquest of America was 
also a discovery, not only —and perhaps not 
most importantly— in the commonplace geo-
graphical sense of the word. Above all, it was a 
discovery of new and different historical expe-
riences and directions. To the astonishment of 
the Europeans of that time, in addition to the 
"exotic" features of this new continent, they 
found in it the historical crystallization of a 
number of long-standing social aspirations 
which until then they had viewed as no more 
than myths belonging to a remote and shrouded 
past. No matter that this European view of the 
American experience was largely the product of 
an imagination which came to know no bounds 
as Europe marveled at its discovery. It does not 
matter because it was America itself which was 
responsible for this expansion of Europe's 
imaginative capacity. Today, it is now common 
knowledge that the American experience (which 
was, first of all, an Andean experience) included 
a number of concrete examples of forms of social 
existence aspired to by the Europeans —the joy 
associated with a form of social solidarity 
unmarred by glaring instances of arbitrariness, 
the legitimacy accorded to diversity among a 
group of human beings sharing a sense of 
community— conditions which were completely 
divorced from the society that they knew. 
I therefore contend that this discovery of 
America completely revolutionized the Euro-
pean imagination and, from thence, the imagi-
nation of the world which had been 
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Europeanized by its rule: the past, as a golden 
age that had been lost forever, was replaced by 
the future, as a golden age to be conquered or 
constructed. 
This is, for me, the basic significance of the 
utopias developed in Europe following the dis-
covery of America. The emergence of these uto-
pias can be regarded as the first step in the 
process leading to modernity. Without the new 
position occupied by the future in man's imagi-
nation, the very idea of modernity would simply 
have been unthinkable. 
For the Europe of this period —which had 
not yet emerged from the crisis of feudal 
society— the utopia of a society free of abhorrent 
hierarchies, arbitrariness and obscurantism was 
the ideology of a prolonged struggle against the 
feudal hierarchies, against the despotism of the 
absolute monarchies, against the use of the 
Church's power to control and hinder the devel-
opment of knowledge, against the supremacy of 
private interests which went hand in hand with 
mercantilism. In other words, it played a part in 
the struggle to establish a rational society, this 
being the greatest hope held out by modernity. 
Thus, America figured prominently in this first 
phase in the process leading to modernity. 
I therefore suggest that during the stage 
associated with the crystallization of modernity, 
as the movement known as the Enlightenment 
unfolded in the eighteenth century, America was 
not merely a bystander or "receptor" but was 
instead part of the world within which this 
movement arose and developed. 
This is demonstrated, first of all, by the fact 
that throughout the eighteenth century, the 
institutions, studies, ideas and knowledge which, 
together, were to be known as the Enlighten-
ment were formed and disseminated at the same 
time in both Europe and America. Circles of 
reformers were established in both the Old and 
New Worlds at the same time; the same topics of 
study and the same issues for debate and research 
made the rounds; the same interest in exploring 
nature was pursued in both places using the 
same tools of knowledge. Everywhere, the desire 
took hold to reform society and its institutions, 
paving the way for political and intellectual free-
dom, as did the criticism of inequalities and arbi-
trariness in human relations. 
When Humboldt arrived in America, he was 
openly surprised to find that circles of American 
intellectuals and scholars, in each of the main 
centres that he visited, had the same knowledge 
and were studying the same subjects as their 
European counterparts. Not only did they read 
the same books; even more importantly, they 
were interested in the same problems because 
they had raised the same issues and were striving 
to investigate them with the same zeal, albeit 
under less favourable conditions. The spirit of 
modernity, its potentials and its demands, were 
developing on an equal footing in America and 
Europe. 
There is, thus, more than merely an anecdo-
tal significance in the fact that a Peruvian, Pablo 
de Olavide y Jáuregui, gained renown in the 
European circles of the Enlightenment, that he 
was a friend of Voltaire, was deeply involved 
with the French encyclopedists and in the politi-
cal experiences of the Spanish Enlightenment. 
When Olavide was subjected to the obscurantist 
persecution of the Inquisition, it was none other 
than Diderot himself who wrote his first biblio-
graphy and launched the campaign in his 
defence. Nor is it surprising that in virtually all 
the European centres of the Enlightenment a 
great campaign in his support was mounted. 
Nor is there anything surprising, therefore, 
about the fact that at the beginning of the follow-
ing century, when the Cortes of Cádiz met in 
1810, the Latin American delegates were among 
the most consistent in upholding a modern 
ideology and in defending liberal radicalism, and 
thus played a prominent role in the drafting of 
the liberal constitution. 
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II 
The paradox of modernity in Latin America 
It can therefore be demonstrated that the move-
ment towards modernity in the eighteenth cen-
tury took place in Latin America at the same 
time as in Europe. Nevertheless, this fact entails 
a surprising paradox. 
In Europe, the spread and growing influence 
of modernity was aided by the development of 
capitalism, along with all that this implied for 
the production of material goods and for inter-
personal relations. In Latin America, however, 
and particularly from the last third of the eigh-
teenth century onward, a noticeable gap began to 
open up between, on the one hand, the ideologi-
cal and social demands of modernity and, on the 
other, the stagnation and disarticulation of the 
mercantile economy, which were so severe as to 
lead to its retrogression in some areas, such as 
the Andean zone. A leading position in the 
society and power structure was thus assumed by 
those sectors and groups most closely associated 
with inequality and arbitrariness, with despot-
ism and obscurantism. With the well-known 
exception of some of those sectors most closely 
linked to the development of European capital-
ism, this contradictory situation was typical of 
the emerging Latin American region. 
In Europe, some aspects of modernity took 
firm hold as a part of daily life, as a social practice 
and as its legitimizing ideology. In Latin Amer-
ica, however, until well into the twentieth cen-
tury modernity was gradually evolving into an 
ideology whose social practice was either 
repressed by the authorities or accepted only as a 
means of legitimizing other practices that ran 
directly counter to it. 
This last circumstance points up the ideolog-
ical importance of modernity in Latin America, 
in spite of the fact that it was hemmed in by a 
society that was moving in the opposite direc-
tion. It also sheds light on, for example, the 
curious sort of relationship existing between the 
region's nominally liberal institutions and con-
stitutions and the conservative power that set 
itself up at the time of independence. This, in its 
turn, can only be understood if it is remembered 
that modernity as a philosophical movement 
was not simply a foreign import but rather a 
homegrown Latin American product, cultivated 
when the region was still a rich and fertile field 
for mercantilism, despite its colonial status. 
Be that as it may, and particularly from the 
nineteenth century onward, modernity in Latin 
America came to be accepted as an intellectual 
attitude, but not as a day-to-day social expe-
rience. Perhaps this accounts for the fact that an 
entire generation of Latin American liberals dur-
ing that century were lured into the trap of 
cultivating the chimera of modernity without 
revolution. And the region has not yet managed 
to struggle completely free of this trap. 
I l l 
Power and modernity in Europe 
The history of modernity in Latin America is 
clearly a paradoxical one. However, its European 
avatar not only failed to eliminate its contradic-
tions, but also subjected it to the Procrustean 
exigencies of the very power which owed its 
existence to it: the bourgeois rationale. 
The concept of rationality inherent in the 
process leading to modernity was not regarded 
as having the same meaning in all the various 
European centres which generated and dissemi-
nated it. In simplified terms and within the lim-
itations of this article, the Saxon countries can be 
said, from the very beginning, to have viewed 
this concept of rationality as being linked in a 
quite essential way to what, since Horkheimer, 
has been known as an instrumental rationale. 
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This, first and foremost, serves as a way of relat-
ing the ends to the means. Rationality was seen 
as a tool, and a tool's usefulness is determined by 
the predominating perspective in which it is 
viewed, i.e., the perspective of power. 
In the southern countries, on the other hand, 
within the context of the debate concerning the 
nature of society, from the very outset the idea of 
rationality was linked to the definition of the 
ends to be pursued: to free society from all 
inequality, arbitrariness, despotism and obscu-
rantism. In short, it was in opposition to the 
ruling power. Seen in this light, modernity holds 
out the hope of a rational social existence in the 
form of freedom, equity, social solidarity and of 
an ongoing improvement in the material condi-
tions of that (and not some other) existence. 
This is the historical rationality that was so dear 
to Medina Echavarria. 
I wish to underscore the fact that, due to the 
exigencies of the occasion, I am simplifying the 
differences between the southern and northern 
European concepts of modernity and rationality, 
but in so doing, I am not attempting to absolve 
Southern Europe of its sins, which may be just as 
serious as those of Northern Europe. However, I 
would add that, while the distinction drawn here 
may be a simplified one, it is not, in my opinion, 
overly arbitrary. 
It is surely not a mere coincidence that the 
leaders of the anti-modernist "neoconservative" 
movement in the United States stress their 
rejection of the "Franco-Continental Enlighten-
ment" and their adherence to the "Anglo-
Scottish Enlightenment" of Locke, Hume and 
Smith in attempting to vindicate the privileged 
position of some groups in respect of others 
within society. Nor is it mere happenstance that 
the spokesmen for this school of thought do not 
hesitate to state that, except insofar as it serves 
to defend law and order (which involves inequal-
ities, despotism and arbitrariness), modernism 
is nothing more than a utopia in the pejorative 
sense of the word. 
This difference became a crucial element in 
determining the fate of modernity and of the 
hopes it held out; the dominant power in terms 
of capital and the position of greatest strength in 
the power relations among the bourgeoisie of 
Europe gradually shifted, beginning in the eigh-
teenth century but especially in the nineteenth, 
towards the British bourgeoisie. Thus, the 
"Anglo-Scottish" version of the Enlightenment 
and of modernity came to dominate the bour-
geois rationale as a whole, not only in Europe but 
internationally as well, due to the worldwide 
imperial presence attained by the British bour-
geoisie. So it was that the'instrumental rationale 
gained precedence over the historical rationale. 
And its worldwide dominion became even more 
firmly entrenched and far-reaching as Britain's 
imperial hegemony gave way to that of the Uni-
ted States after the end of the First World War. 
Then, under the Pax Americana and its 
extreme version of the instrumental rationale, 
after the Second World War pressure began to 
be exerted upon Latin America to "modernize": 
the rationality in question had by now been di-
vested of any connection whatsoever to the 
promises originally held out by modernity and 
was instead based solely on the exigencies of 
capital, productivity and the effectiveness of 
given means in achieving the ends dictated by 
capital interests and by the empire. In the final 
analysis, then, it was merely an instrument of 
power. In broad sectors of Latin America, this 
reinforced the beguiling chimera of a type of 
modernity not involving any sort of revolution. 
The consequences of this deception are still with 
us; we have not yet completely emerged from the 
dark tunnel of militarism and authoritarianism. 
The most comprehensive example of what 
successful "modernization" has meant for Latin 
America is perhaps the changeover from an oli-
garchic to a modernized State. In all of the coun-
tries, the State has been "modernized". Its 
institutional apparatus has grown and has even 
become somewhat more professionalized; the 
State is less of a prisoner to society and, in one 
sense (within its scope of action), is more 
national. All of this, however, has not made it 
more democratic or more conducive to the 
organization of national societies with a view to 
meeting the needs of the population, or more 
legitimately representative or, perhaps, more 
stable either. 
The system of beliefs of the burgeoisie was 
not the only school of thought to be affected by 
the dominating influence of the instrumental 
rationale. Even socialism, which arose as an 
alternative to the burgeois rationale and was 
presented as the most direct and legitimate vehi-
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cle for the hopes of liberation held out by moder-
nity, gave in to the attractions of the 
instrumental rationale for quite some time and 
was unable to establish itself as anything but 
"socialism as it was actually practised", i.e., as 
Stalinism. 
This is the modernity which has been pro-
claimed to be crisis by new prophets, almost all 
of whom are apostates of their former faith in 
socialism, or at least, in radical liberalism. On 
both sides of the Atlantic, these prophets of 
"post-modernity" or of the most blatent form of 
anti-modernism also want to persuade us that 
the hopes of liberation held out by modernity are 
not only unattainable now, but always were so; 
that, after Nazism and Stalinism, no one could 
still believe in them; and that the only thing that 
is real in this world ¡s power, the technology of 
power, the language of power. 
The crisis of this version of modernity, rede-
fined as it has been by the unchallenged pre-
eminence of the instrumental rationale, is 
following the same path as the crisis of capitalist 
society, especially as regards the course taken by 
these two processes since the late 1960s. And 
this type of modernity certainly need not be 
defended or be viewed with any trace of nostalgia 
whatsoever, particularly in Latin America. It was 
under its reign that we were charged with the 
task of satisfying the worst demands of foreign 
capital and of rooting out the dominating influ-
ence of the historical rationale from the Latin 
American consciousness just when independ-
ence was being won. 
The problem, however, is that the prophets 
of "post-modernity" and of anti-modernity are 
not only inviting us to attend the funeral of the 
hopes of liberation associated with the historical 
rationale and its particular type of modernity, 
but also, and even more importantly, are urging 
us to refrain, henceforward, from addressing the 
issues raised by the latter, to refrain from resum-
ing the struggle to liberate society from the sway 
of power and, from now on to accept nothing but 
the logic of technology and the language of 
power. Behind the smoke screen thrown up by 
this debate, there are the unmistakable signs of 
the same forces which, after the crisis that 
erupted into the First World War, banded 
together to assault and to try to destroy all traces 
of any sort of utopia of equity, solidarity and 
freedom. They were not entirely successful, but 
they did manage to weaken the position of the 
historical rationale. Today, these same forces 
appear to be raising their heads once again. 
Moreover, the convergence of these two 
crises has transformed a number of the cross-
roads at which the present debate concerning 
society has arrived into what appear to be dead-
end streets. This is particularly serious as regards 
the debate concerning the problems of depend-
ent societies which have been established on the 
basis of extreme inequalities and which have not 
entirely or definitively eradicated the arbitrary 
and despotic use of power, even within the 
limited confines of developed capitalist societies. 
The dependent societies, such as those of Latin 
America, are the ones which feel the pressures of 
the problems created by the extreme concentra-
tion of power, as well as bearing the brunt of 
those generated by the capitalist development of 
Europe or the United States. 
The history of modernity in Latin America 
is, however, more complex than that of Europe 
and the United States in that it contains the 
elements of an alternative rationality 
—elements which, moreover, are taking shape 
once again. Because the logic of capital and of the 
corresponding instrumental rationale was not 
fully developed, it was unable to completely 
override the historical insights which, once they 
had entered the consciousness of an astonished 
Europe in the early sixteenth century, gave birth 
to this new rationality. 
The main blind alley to which the instru-
mental rationale leads is undoubtedly the one 
represented by the conflict between private and 
State ownership of production resources. Even 
the most general sort of discussion of the rela-
tions between the State and society will ulti-
mately revolve around this dispute. 
Of course, when couched in these terms, the 
debate as to the proper roles of the public and 
private sectors in the economy and in society 
cannot break out of its present deadlock. Basi-
cally, both sides work on the basis of the same 
assumptions and the same categories: for both, 
"private" refers to the private sector as it has 
been shaped by capitalist interests, and "State" 
or "public" refers to the State/public facet of the 
private sector as defined in those terms and is 
perhaps its rival, but not its opponent. For both 
sides, the instrumental rationale turns back upon 
itself, creating a vicious circle. 
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IV 
The bases for a different type of modernity: a 
different concept of the private sector and 
a different concept of the public sector 
There are two extreme positions vying with one 
another for the dominant role in establishing the 
economic orientation of present-day society. The 
first is "socialism as it is actually practised", i.e., 
that which was structured under Stalinism. For 
this school of thought, State ownership of all 
production resources and distribution mecha-
nisms and State control of all decisions concern-
ing the orientation of the entire economic 
apparatus are central to the idea of socialism. 
This idea, as expressed in Latin America, has 
influenced not only socialist propositions as 
such, but also the various versions of populism/ 
nationalism/developmentalism. Seventy years 
after its first appearance, it is reasonable to con-
clude that this approach will not carry us very far 
along the road towards a rational society in 
terms of the hopes held out by socialism. Under 
this type of socialism, the economy can only be 
developed up to a certain point, after which it is 
paralysed by the weight of bureaucracy. Equity, 
social solidarity and freedom, democracy for pro-
ducers, cannot take root or flourish under this 
sort of system. 
At the other extreme there is "neo-
liberalism", for which the private capitalist 
ownership of production resources and the 
"invisible hand" of the market —free, ideally, of 
any limitation, control or guidance by the 
State— are the sine qua non for the creation and 
widespread distribution of wealth and for any 
full expression of political democracy. Yet it has 
been shown beyond all doubt —and especially in 
the experience of the vast majority of Latin 
Americans— that this line of thought, too, fails 
to lead to equality, social solidarity or political 
democracy. 
Within the historical context of today, this 
concept of the private sector has given rise to the 
vertical structure that is typical of large corpora-
tions, which can very probably be equated with 
the "modernized" vertical structure (i.e., a struc-
ture which has been liberalized by the reintro-
duction of some degree of private ownership and 
of a private market) of the vast bureaucracies 
associated with "socialism as it is actually 
practised". 
In the Latin America of today, very few peo-
ple other than the most steadfast defenders of 
the power of capital hearken to the songs of 
these "neo-liberal" sirens. At the same time, 
however, after the region's recent experiences 
with "real socialism", it is very likely that the 
proponents of State control over the economy 
have also declined in number. The virtual paraly-
sis of purposeful economic acttion in the coun-
tries of the region is perhaps a manifestation of 
this, rather than of anything else. All the coun-
tries of the region, without exception, are mark-
ing time as they concern themselves with 
short-term (and, frequently, with extremely 
short-term) measures, while lacking long-term 
plans or, for that matter, many proposals point-
ing in that direction. Indeed, the stand-off 
between "neo-liberaUsm" and this sort of "neo-
developmentalism" ("neo", because the issues 
and proposals associated with it have paled and 
become less forceful but are otherwise the same 
as those of the old type of developmentalism) 
has become a trap, an apparently dead-end 
street. 
Behind the scenes of this deadlocked debate, 
it is fairly easy to discern the fact that two forces 
have lined up in opposition to one another: the 
capitalist private sector and the capitalist State 
sector, i.e., two faces of the same instrumental 
rationale, each masking one of the social agents 
now vying for control over capital and power; in 
other words, the private burgeoisie and the 
bureaucracy (which some regard as the State 
burgeoisie). In the final analysis, neither of them 
offers a solution for the pressing problems 
affecting the region's societies, much less a 
means of realizing the hopes of liberation held 
out by the historical rationale. 
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The capitalist or, more generally, the mer-
cantile private sector represents interests that 
run counter to those of society as a whole; as a 
result, the private sector's interests are compati-
ble with equity, solidarity, freedom or democracy 
only up to a certain limit. In terms of this type of 
private sector, the State or public sphere is the 
expression of that limited compatibility; it goes 
into action and imposes its authority precisely 
when the ultimate logic of domination is threa-
tened (and, as regards the exercise of such 
authority in its limited forms, when it is pres-
sured to do so by those it dominates). State 
capitalism, "real socialism" and the welfare State 
all belong to the same family, but act within 
different contexts and in response to different 
sorts of specific needs. Complete State control 
over the economy and State dominance in society 
can thus be seen as representing the interests of 
the society as a whole vis-a-vis private interests. 
Nevertheless, since this neither eliminates the 
presence of domination and inequality nor even 
tends to do so, the private sector is eventually 
reinstated in these economies. Under these cir-
cumstances, private activity arises as a necessary 
reaction when the suffocating weight of bureau-
cracy entailed by State ownership and control 
causes production to stagnate. 
The private sector and its activity thus serve 
a function. Nonetheless, the historical expe-
rience of Latin America suggests that the capital-
ist or mercantile private sector is not the only 
possible form of private activity and that the 
State or public sector in this specifically State-
oriented sense is not the only other possible 
counterpart to the private sector either. Indeed, 
although it does not figure as such in the debate 
of these issues, there is another concept of what 
is private and of what is public, a concept which 
was not only part of Latin America's earlier 
history but which is still with us today, one that 
tends to come to light in broader and more 
complex spheres. 
For purposes of illustrating this point (it 
being understood that, in doing so, I am not 
setting it forth as the most desirable or effective 
option), I would like to use the Andean commun-
ity as an example. The first question to be asked 
is whether this community is private or State/ 
public. And the answer is that ¡t is private. This 
community functioned in the past and it con-
tinues to function today. Before its subjugation 
by the empire and throughout the whole time 
that it was a colony, it represented a unique 
environment, one characterized by reciprocity, 
solidarity, democracy and its corresponding free-
doms; indeed, it was an island of solidarity and of 
the feeling of well-being that goes along with it 
amidst a sea of domination. Later, it continued to 
function in the face of the assault of a type of 
liberalism that had already been won over by the 
instrumental rationale and in the face of the 
power of the caciques. And it continues to func-
tion now in the face of the power wielded by 
capital. And it is private. 
What I wish to demonstrate by means of this 
example is that there is another possible type of 
private sector which is neither capitalist nor 
mercantile; there is more than just one form of 
private activity. What name should this other 
form be given? For the time being, for want of a 
better term, I will refer to it as a "socially-
oriented" form of private activity in order to 
differentiate it from self-seeking types of private 
endeavour. 
I wish to make it clear, however, that I am in 
no way proposing a return to an agrarian com-
munitarism such as that characteristic of the 
Andean zone in pre-colonial times or even today. 
Present-day society, its needs and potentials are 
undoubtedly too complex for such an institution 
to cope with them satisfactorily. This does not 
mean, however, that such an institution could 
not serve as the basis, or one of the bases, for the 
establishment of another type of rationale. After 
all, wasn't its impact on the European imagina-
tion what marked the beginnings of European 
modernity and of the compelling utopia of a 
rational society? 
By the same token, I also wish to make it 
clear that if I refer to the re-establishment of the 
concept of a socially-oriented type of private 
sector in Latin America, likening it to that of the 
Andean community, it is because it is possible to 
see such a concept at work in the region within 
today's highly complex and tremendously diver-
sified society. A democratic form of organization 
based on solidarity and collective effort, which 
restores reciprocity as the foundation for solidar-
ity and democracy, is currently one of the most 
widespread ways of organizing the day-to-day 
activities and life experiences of a vast portion of 
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the population in Latin America as these people 
band together in an effort to survive, to with-
stand the crisis and to defy the capitalist logic of 
underdevelopment. 
These forms of social experience cannot be 
regarded as merely circumstantial or transitory 
phenomena. At this point, they have become 
sufficiently institutionalized to warrant their 
acceptance as established social practices for 
many sectors, especially the urban poor, who 
constitute the great majority of the population in 
many cases. For example, in Peru, what is known 
as the barriada contains around 70% of the 
urban population, which, in turn, makes up 70% 
of the national population. It is therefore not an 
overstatement to assert that the barriada has 
represented, particularly as regards the develop-
ment of a new sort of inter-subjectivity, the 
primary form of social and cultural experience in 
Peru for the past 30 years. And these new forms 
of socially-oriented private activity are a central 
element of this experience. 
In other words, the reciprocity seen within 
the Andean community has engendered the type 
of reciprocity seen today in the most oppressed 
strata of the "modernized" urban society asso-
ciated with the dependent and underdeveloped 
capitalism of Latin America. This provides the 
basis for the formation of á new concept of 
socially-oriented private activity which repres-
ents an alternative to the concept of capitalist 
private activity that predominates today. 
Two issues need to be clarified at this point 
in the discussion. Firstly, there is no doubt about 
the fact that capitalist private enterprise is, by a 
wide margin, the predominant form of activity 
in the country as a whole, in the urban popula-
tion living in the barriada as a group, and among 
the poor strata within that population. 
Moreover, its logic not only exists alongside that 
associated with reciprocity, solidarity and demo-
cracy, but alos intermingles with it and alters it. 
The institutions formed on the basis of reciproc-
ity, equality and solidarity are not —within the 
urban areas— islands in a capital-dominated sea. 
They are part and parcel of that sea and, in their 
turn alter and control the logic of capital. 
Secondly, these are not scattered and uncon-
nected institutions. On the contrary, especially 
during the past two decades, they have tended to 
form links with one another, thereby setting up 
vast networks which, in many cases, cover the 
whole of the country concerned. These institu-
tions have also begun to increase the complexity 
of their links with one another; just as the tradi-
tional sort of labour unions do or used to do, they 
group together both by sector and in national 
organizations. In the case of these new institu-
tions of socially-oriented private activity, how-
ever, their sectoral linkages and the formation of 
a national network made up of all these sectors 
do not necessarily involve the establishment of 
any body as such. In other words, the institution-
alized socially-oriented private sector tends to 
generate its own public institutional sphere, but 
the latter does not necessarily exhibit the charac-
teristics of a State; it does not take on the form of 
an institutional apparatus which sets itself apart 
from or which places itself above the social prac-
tices and the institutions associated with day-to-
day life in society. Thus, even though the 
institutions providing overall or sectoral links 
among the components of the socially-oriented 
private sector constitute a public sphere, they do 
not represent a State power, but rather a type of 
power within society. 
Because these institutions of the socially-
oriented private sector and of its public sphere 
are to be found within a context in which 
individually- rather than socially-oriented pri-
vate activity and the corresponding type of State 
predominate, they are inevitably affected by the 
prevailing logic of capital. The presence of 
manipulation, bureaucratization and the exploi-
tation of power are signs of the influence exerted 
by individually-oriented private activity, by the 
logic of capital, by its State. Even under these 
conditions, however, the practices and institu-
tions associated with this new socially-oriented 
private sector and its public, non-State institu-
tions not only manage to exist but also to perpet-
uate themselves, to grow in both number and 
variety, thereby forming a new and far-reaching 
organizational network for a new sort of "civil 
society". 
The expansion of this process in Peru is 
probably due to the severity of the crisis affecting 
that society. A large part of the population has 
been pushed into rediscovering and re-
establishing —within the setting of a new and 
more complex historical contex— one of the 
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most deeply-rooted, longest-lasting and richest 
facets of Peruvian culture: the Andean 
community. 
This new socially-oriented private sector 
and its public, non-State network are able to 
function under the most adverse and severe con-
ditions; indeed, they are precisely what permit 
the people to survive in such a situation. In other 
words, a social praxis based on solidarity, equal-
ity, freedom and democracy is the only means of 
surviving in spite of and in opposition to the 
present logic of power, of capital and of the 
In addition to the crisis of the present form of 
European/North American modernity, there is 
not only a shift away from the historical ratio-
nale and towards the instrumental rationale, but 
also a sort of "culturalism", whose main feature 
is its rejection of any sort of modernity at all. 
This rejection therefore applies to what might 
be refferred to as the "rationale of liberation" as 
well, and involves a return tq the elements of 
each individual culture, which are seen as the 
only true criteria for establishing the legitimacy 
of social practices and their institutions. 
The interests of these two movements coin-
cide. Indeed, together they form the basis of the 
fundamentalist approaches now flourishing in 
all parts of the world and in all types of doctrines. 
In both, the predominance of prejudice and myth 
play a basic role in orienting social practices 
because only on this basis can they mount a 
defense of all sorts of inequalities and hierar-
chies, no matter how reprehensible they maybe, 
including all the various forms of racism, chauvi-
nism and xenophobia. 
As the crisis of present-day capitalist society 
becomes more visible and proves to be a more 
drawn-out process, confidence in the instrumen-
tal rationale has ebbed in more and more sectors 
of this society. In parallel with this, a more 
pressing need has been felt for a different type of 
comprehensive historical perspective. Ironically 
instrumental rationale. It is, therefore, neither 
unfounded nor overly bold to suggest that under 
favourable conditions, these new social practices 
and the corresponding public institutional net-
works might not only permit survival, but could 
also serve as both a setting and a foundation for a 
genuinely democratic integration of society and 
could provide a real opportunity for true and 
differentiated self-fulfilment of the individual. 
Put another way, they could act as the vehicles 
for the hopes of liberation represented by a 
rational and, in this sense, modern society. 
enough, particularly among the subjugated peo-
ples within this society, this has prompted 
demands that a break be made with European 
modernity and the rationale associated with 
Europe and the United States and has been con-
ducive to a return to a purely culturalist idiosyn-
cratic approach. However, it has also led people 
to look to other cultures in an attempt to find 
new elements with which to lay the foundatiqns 
for a liberating rationale; these cultures are the 
same ones which Eurocentrism, during the 
height of its power, pictured as being divorced 
from any rationale whatsoever or as being com-
pletely immobilized under its domination; the 
same ones which, as a result of the impact they 
had on the European imagination beginning in 
the late fifteenth century, served as the starting 
point for the utopia of a liberating form of 
modernity. The documentation which has been 
amassed in this connection over the years is 
voluminous and quite compelling. 
Hence, the debate concerning the relation-
ship between the region's own cultural heritage 
and the demands of a new type of historical 
rationale has once again come to the fore in Latin 
America. I suggest that the compqnents of this 
cultural heritage can be viewed as representing 
an historical path or direction which runs coun-
ter both to the primacy of the instrumental ratio-
nale and to obscurantist culturalism and which is 
V 
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primarily manifested in the social experiences of 
large collectivities. These social practices, whose 
basic components include reciprocity, equity, 
solidarity, individual freedom and democracy as 
expressed in daily life, have, in the face of highly 
adverse circumstances, demonstrated their suita-
bility as part of a new type of liberating rationale. 
It is necessary to clarify a few things at this 
point in the discussion. First of all, the fact 
should be borne in mind that modernity arose in 
America at the same time as it did in Europe and 
that the people playing the major role in this 
process were members of the ruling class and 
descendants of Europeans. These people's posi-
tion as members of this ruling class blinded them 
to the fact that the culture of the groups they 
ruled, the "Indians", contained many of the ele-
ments which would later form part of European 
rationality when it was still guided by the rela-
tionship between reason and liberation. When 
this connection became obscured and was rele-
gated to a secondary position as the relationship 
between domination and a different type of rea-
soning gained sway, this ruling group became 
even blinder still. 
The supremacy of the oligarchical criollo 
culture, which was promoted by this shift, is now 
coming to an end throughout Latin America. Its 
social foundations and its sources have been 
undermined and, in most of the countries, have 
now disintegrated, and this culture is conse-
quently no longer perpetuating itself. At one 
time, the decline of this culture appeared to be 
making way solely for a cultural "moderniza-
tion", i.e., for the primacy of the instrumental 
rationale. And this might indeed have been the 
case if it had not been for the fact that the 
outward expansion of international capital ran 
up against the limitations which are evident 
today and entered into a severe and prolonged 
crisis, along with all the rest of the power struc-
ture in these countries. As it is, however, the 
region's social, ethnic and cultural diversity has 
been reinforced during the crisis, and the one-
track one-way transition from "tradition" to 
"modernization" envisioned by ideologues is 
not, in fact, taking place. On the contrary, at a 
time of conflict and crisis in both society and the 
culture, the more underdeveloped the capitalist 
system is, the wider are the breaches through 
which the overall cultural heritage opposed to 
"modernization" is re-emerging. Clearly, this 
heritage comes into its own when the subjugated 
groups move up into the front lines of this battle. 
All of this does not mean, however, that the 
overall cultural heritage of Latin America, or 
that which is produced and lived by subjugated 
groups, stems only from the region's ancestral 
culture of pre-colonial times. Far from it. It is 
true that this heritage draws strength from the 
wellsprings of the past conquests of rationality 
in these lands, which resulted in reciprocity, 
solidarity and the joy of collective work, but 
these historical currents also converge with 
those of the African experience and, together, 
they keep the. tree of life intact, while in other 
cultures a gap has opened up between the tree of 
life and that of knowledge; and this is what has 
thwarted the reduction of rationality to no more 
than a feeble and superficial type of rationalism. 
The European and Euro-North American cul-
tures, too, which have continued to influence the 
region, have contributed elements that are not 
part of the rationale of power. More recently, 
Asia has also helped to enrich and diversify this 
multi-faceted heritage. This is, therefore, a 
strong heritage capable of withstanding 
attempts to reduce it to no more than an instru-
mental rationale. The peculiar tension to be 
noted in Latin American thought stems from the 
complexity of this heritage. 
There is therefore no reason why we should 
confuse the rejection of the elements of Eurocen-
trism present in the culture and of the instru-
mental logic of capital with some sort of 
obscurantist appeal to reject or abandon the 
hopes of liberation originally held out by moder-
nity: the desanctification, first and foremost, of 
the authoritarian elements to be found in our 
way of thinking and in society, of social hierar-
chies, prejudices and their corresponding stereo-
types; the freedom to think and to learn, to doubt 
and to question; freedom of expression and of 
communication; individual freedom freed of 
individualism; the idea of the equality and frater-
nity of all peoples, and of their human dignity. 
Not all of this originated in Europe, nor was it 
fulfilled or even respected there either. But it 
was from Europe that it came to Latin America. 
The concept of a socially-oriented private 
sector and of the institutions linking up its com-
ponents within a non-State public sphere 
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represents an alternative to the blind alley into 
which we have been led by the State and private 
adherents of the logic of capital and its power. 
The backdrop for this Latin American concept is 
the fact that Latin America is the oldest and most 
continuous source in the world today of an his-
torical rationale shaped by the amalgamation of 
Many far-reaching issues are raised at this point. 
Within the limited scope of this article, I cannot 
hope even to address all of the most important 
ones, much less discuss them in depth. Some of 
them should at least be identified, however. 
First of all, there is an evident need to rede-
fine the whole issue of what is public and what is 
private, and not only within the framework of 
the current debate going on in Latin America. It 
seems to me to be relatively less difficult to grasp 
the idea and image of a different type of private 
sector which is basically opposed to that of prí-
vate ownership and the power structure that 
goes along with it. I believe something more 
needs to be said, however, about .the idea of a 
non-State public sphere, which is both distinct 
from and opposed to the State and its public 
sector. 
One important aspect of this question of 
what is public and what is private is that, within 
the relationship established between the two 
within the capitalist system (and, in general, 
within any power structure which includes the 
State), the private sector represents an inde-
pendent sphere of social practices and institu-
tions which are counterposed to those of the 
State at the same time that they are linked to it 
and are expressed through it. In this connection, 
the main issue is the independence of the private 
sphere from the State and its ability to exert a 
major influence over society. Within this contra-
dictory relationship, the public institutions 
which establish links among various practices in 
civil society are not as visible as are the public 
institutions of the State. The State is, by nature, a 
sphere of practices and institutions which stand 
the victories of reason won in all the cultures of 
the globe. The utopia of a rationale that would 
liberate society is more than just an enlightened 
vision in the Latin America of today. Its threads 
have begun to be woven into a part of our daily 
life. This rationale may be repressed, perhaps 
even defeated; but it cannot be ignored. 
above and outside the sphere of daily life within 
civil society. These types of conflicts do not arise 
between the socially-oriented private and non-
State public sectors, since the public sphere 
exists only as a means of linking up the various 
components of the socially-oriented private 
sphere; indeed, this could not be otherwise with-
out changing the very nature of the non-State 
public sphere and converting it into a State. In 
contrast, all States are able to exist, and to estab-
lish and perpetuate their specific institutions, 
not only outside the scope of civil society, but 
often in opposition to its institutions. This 
peculiar type of clash can be observed through-
out the history of Latin America. In the debate 
concerning the State and civil society in Latin 
America, the former is one of the most indistinct 
concepts, precisely because the best-known anal-
ysis of it is based on the assumption that State 
institutions are in keeping with the character of 
civil society and thus fails even to question the 
representativeness of this State. The whole of 
the regions' historical experience runs counter to 
these assumptions, however. And now, given 
the present situation, a crisis has clearly arisen in 
respect of the question of representation as well. 
This issue brings us back to the subject of 
freedom and democracy in relation to the public 
and private spheres, which is a pivotal element 
in the current debate going on both inside and 
outside Latin America. As everyone knows, 
today a leading school of thought, of Scottish-
Anglo-North American origins, in the field of 
political theory views individual freedoms as 
being features of the private sphere which must 
be defended against public/State interference. 
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On the other hand,.however, it focuses on the 
need for law and order, which must be imposed 
and defended by the State. Thus, a contradictory 
relationship is set up between freedom, on the 
one hand, and law and order, on the other, which 
at bottom reflects the relationship existing 
between the State and civil society. The problem, 
then, remains unresolved; nor does this focus 
provide any prospect of a solution other than the 
empirical one which is co be found in the none 
too attractive history of the trade-offs made 
between order and freedom, especially in Latin 
America. 
I therefore contend that it is not surprising 
that the instrumental rationale —rather than 
the historical rationale of liberation— is the one 
which governs the relationships between free-
dom and order in both theory and practice, even 
though the idea of political freedom is one of the 
victories of modernity. This points up the fact 
that the relationships between personal freedom 
and the needs of society as a whole (i.e., "order") 
are radically different within the context of the 
relationships between the socially-oriented pri-
vate and non-State public sectors. In this setting, 
the needs of society as a whole, as expressed in 
the non-State public sphere, are not and could 
not be anything other than the articulation of the 
needs of the socially-oriented private sector. 
This is why there is neither opposition nor con-
flict between the requirements of collective 
solidarity, reciprocity and democracy, on the one 
hand, and the requirements for the differen-
tiated self-fulfilment of the individual, on the 
, other. 
The defence of personal freedom and even of 
equality may not, given certain conditions, be so 
difficult to achieve within the private sphere. 
Throughout history, the problem has always 
been how to establish them and exercise them 
within the public sphere, which is where they are 
at risk. Within the framework of the relation-
ships between the private and State sectors, it 
has thus far proved possible, for all intents and 
purposes, for personal freedom to be exercised 
only by some people at the expense of others. 
There are always some who are not only "more 
equal" than others, but also more free. Within 
the alternative framework, however, "order" 
cannot be the result of anything but the personal 
freedom of all; but this is precisely what order 
does not and cannot do within the context of the 
relationships existing between the State and 
society. This type of order always upholds the 
freedom of some at the cost of the freedom of 
others. It thus becomes evident that the relation-
ship between the socially-oriented private and 
non-State public spheres which is emerging in 
Latin America makes it necessary to regard the 
issue of freedom and democracy in a different 
light and from a different angle. 
Returning to the concept of socially-oriented 
private activity, this idea makes it possible to 
consider the issue of production and distribution, 
as well as their prospects and foundations, 
within a new context. This involves the question 
of reciprocity, which has been presented earlier 
in this article as one of the main and necessary 
elements of a different concept of private activ-
ity. The mercantile or capitalist concept of pri-
vate endeavour is based on the supplantation of 
reciprocity by the market; within the context of 
the socially-oriented private sector, however, the 
market cannot play the same role or cannot have 
the same character. Although, in the course of 
the current debate in this connection, the idea of 
the market has been transformed into an almost 
mystical concept, it is surely obvious to the entire 
world that it involves nothing less than an align-
ment of forces. In other words, it involves a 
power-based relationship, a power structure, or 
at least a component and instance thereof. This 
is why the rationale of the market is incapable of 
accommodating any type of reasoning other 
than the most blatent sort of instrumental ratio-
nale. By its very nature, the market rules out the 
possibility of reciprocity, or allows for its pres-
ence only as a means to its own ends, and then 
only on an exceptional basis. Reciprocity is a 
special type of exchange; it is not necessarily 
related to value in terms of the objects involved 
in a transaction, but instead tends to be based on 
value in terms of usefulness. It is not a question 
of an abstract equivalence whereby the commo-
nality of objects is what counts, but rather their 
diversity. In one sense, it is an exchange of servi-
ces which can take the form of an exchange of 
objects but need not always nor necessarily do so. 
It is therefore more practicable to associate reci-
procity with equality and solidarity. Reciprocity 
is not a single, well-defined concept nor is there 
just one way of practising it, at least insofar as it 
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is defined in the anthropological literature. 
Nonetheless, it is safe to say that, whereas the 
market involves the fragmentation and differen-
tiation of interests within society and is coupled 
with an atomistic world view, reciprocity 
involves the linkage of interests within society 
and is part of an aggregative concept of the 
world. 
In the history of the Andean zone, for exam-
ple, the presence of reciprocity did not prevent 
the exercise of power and domination. Never-
theless, it did act at both the base and the apex of 
the ruling structure as a mechanism of solidarity, 
as a form of exchange between equals and, at the 
same time, as a mechanism for articulation and 
solidarity between the rulers and the ruled, 
between groups that were not on an equal foot-
ing. This suggests that reciprocity does not 
necessarily imply equality. But, unlike the 
market, it does imply solidarity. Within the con-
text of the market, people act only as agents for 
the exchange of equivalent objects. Within the 
framework of reciprocity, objects are no more 
than symbols of people themselves. The market 
is, by nature, impersonal. Reciprocity is 
personal. 
As part of the current process of establishing 
social practices, reciprocity is linked to equality, 
freedom and democracy, rather than only to 
solidarity. This constitutes a visible indication of 
the convergence of the Andean rationale and the 
rationale of European modernity. Even though 
the former is not, therefore, completely free 
from the onslaught of potencially dominant for-
ces, in this new context it can be considered as a 
basis for a new type of rationale borne of a 
history that has been enriched by many other 
different histories. Nevertheless, it should also 
be regarded as part of a power structure rather 
than as some sort of mechanism by which all 
power is eliminated. The co-ordinated diversity 
which reciprocity entails, social solidarity, social 
equality and personal freedom, when seen as 
components of a new system of democracy, do 
not imply the dissolution of all power. Demo-
cracy, no matter how demos it may be, is also 
cratos. This is, for that matter, implicit in the 
formation of a public sphere within this new 
private environment. However, this is necessar-
ily a different type of power structure than that 
linking the capitalist private and State sectors. In 
this new type of structure, power regains its 
social dimension; there is an enormous demand 
for a politically direct form of social expression 
which is not necessarily channelled through the 
State. 
This issue is too important to be omitted 
from the present discussion. It is essential to 
underscore the fact that these new types of pub-
lic and private practices cannot gain ascendancy 
among social practices as a whole unless they 
represent an alternative sort of power. Private 
enterprise in its current form, together with the 
corresponding type of State, will not cease to try 
to obstruct, divide, distort or eliminate these new 
institutions, which will only be able to develop 
and to consolidate themselves if they are power-
ful enough to defend themselves against the 
present power structure and, ultimately, to win 
out over it. Unlike other options, this alternative 
power is not only a goal but also a road to that 
goal, and we are currently travelling down that 
road. 
This is not the proper place to raise issues 
whose consideration would carry us beyond the 
scope of this discussion. I believe that what has 
been said up to this point provides sufficient 
material with which to initiate a debate. It is, 
however, necessary to provide a few explana-
tions and clarifications. 
Some people have wondered whether, 
because such socially-oriented private and non-
State public institutions, are based on reciprocity 
and solidarity, they might not be a phenomenon 
found only in certain cultural or even, perhaps, 
ethnic areas in which reciprocity is a key element 
in the cultural history (as, for example, in the 
Andean culture). But, they ask, what do such 
practices have to do with other areas of Latin 
America, particularly the countries of the South-
ern Cone? 
There is no doubt about the fact that these 
new types of social practices, which embody a 
new historical rationale, are accepted and culti-
vated more easily in areas where they are rooted 
in the historical legacy of the past. This is cer-
tainly the case among the population of Andean 
origin. Nonetheless, there is a great deal of docu-
mentation of the same types of practices in virtu-
ally all sectors of the urban population that have 
become impoverished during the long crisis 
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being experienced today, in all or almost all of 
the Latin American countries. Sufficient evi-
dence to this effect can be found in the history of 
the invasions and settlement of urban land 
which have taken place in the region by examin-
ing the forms of organization, mobilization and 
subsistence to be observed in these cases. This 
has been a fairly recent part of Chile's history, for 
example. In that country, recent research pro-
jects concerning the agrarian process since 1973 
have indicated that peasant communities have 
been established in areas formerly inhabited 
only by small landowners or tenant farmers 
because some groups of peasants have disco-
vered that they can survive only by pooling their 
small farms and scant resources. This discovery 
of reciprocity and solidarity among equals as a 
means of survival does not necessarily, then, 
occur only as an extension of a people's own 
cultural history; nor is it always solely a response 
to an ultimate need, such as survival. It may also 
occur as a response to the need for a collective 
historical perspective in order to withstand the 
collapse of those which were formerly in domi-
nant or firmly entrenched. One good example of 
this is the wide-ranging network of organiza-
tions formed by Christians who uphold the 
theology of liberation, the poor, the persecuted 
and core groups of intellectuals and profession-
als as they band together in resistance move-
ments throughout all the countries of the region. 
Recently, in some countries (such as Peru, 
for example), slogans such as "self-
management", "associative enterprises", etc., 
have been used to describe institutions which are 
basically bureaucratic but which are nevertheless 
depicted —in what amounts to a successful 
advertising campaign, especially outside the 
country— as being institutions of a system of 
direct democracy. The social groups associated 
with so-called "self-managing" bodies were thus 
seen as laying the foundations for a corporative 
reorganization of the State as a means of over-
coming a very protracted crisis of representa-
tion. These schemes failed, chiefly due to 
contradictions within the system supporting 
them, and their objectives were therefore not 
achieved; hence, the crisis has only grown worse, 
thereby strengthening the long-standing belief 
among many people that the past was a better 
time than the present. In Latin America, the past 
few decades have been so disastrous for so many 
people that they have come to think that only 
something worse can be expected from the 
future. This gives rise to the suspicion that the 
new types of social practices characteristic of the 
socially-oriented private and non-State public 
sectors are always, or may be, in danger of being 
redefined and distorted. This danger is a very 
real one, as is the more open sort of repression 
aimed at the destruction of these practices rather 
than only at their improper appropriation or 
distortion. 
A similar definition of terms may be called 
for with respect to the whole range of ideological 
and political derivations associated with the con-
cept of the "informal sector", which is referred 
to so frequently these days in Latin America. 
Within the scope of this discussion it will suffice, 
for the moment, to underscore something which 
was said earlier. In the world of the barriada (or 
in the slum dwellings and shantytowns, what-
ever the name used to refer to them, in the 
various countries) the normative structures of 
the market and of capitalism coexist with, 
oppose and rely on those of reciprocity and solid-
arity and vice versa. A large part of the popula-
tion moves easily back and forth between these 
two normative contexts as their needs dictate, 
which suggests that their adherence and loyalties 
to one or the other are not yet completely 
defined. In this not only psycho-social but also 
structural sense, this population continues to be 
a marginal one which forms part of the great 
social diversity characterizing the structure of 
Latin American society today. The "informal" 
economy is, to a great extent, made up of this 
population, although another part of it is formed 
by people who definitely espouse the logic and 
norms of capital and its interests. The clash 
between the outlook associated with the logic 
and interests of capital and that corresponding 
to an approach based on reciprocity and solidar-
ity is exploited, to the benefit of the former, by 
certain political movements. 
Obviously, for "neoliberalism", nothing 
could be more laudable than the so-called "infor-
mal" economy; within its sphere, the rules of the 
market can function with the greatest possible 
freedom; the quality and price of products 
(goods or services) are subject to no controls 
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whatsoever; wages are not governed by any sort 
of legislation; there is no social security, no vaca-
tions, benefits or union rights. No one pays any 
direct taxes, even though everyone uses services 
provided by the State. No form of organization 
by exploited groups within the sector would be 
tolerated. All this makes it possible for a compli-
cated apparatus to exist which links large-scale 
"formal" enterprise with "informal" labour and 
markets. It is obvious who benefits from this 
arrangement, since no "informal" economy is 
really divorced from the overall financial appa-
ratus of capital interests in each country, and 
nobody has demonstrated the existence of any 
sort of blockage or breakdown in the channels by 
which value and profits are transferred between 
the "informal" and "formal" economies. This 
does not detract from the exceptional energy and 
initiative exhibited by "informal" workers in 
their daily lives as they manage to survive under 
crisis conditions, to produce and earn, and to 
obtain work, income and housing outside the 
scope of the State and sometimes against its will. 
All of this, certainly, can and should be promoted 
and developed. But it may also be directed and 
channelled, and therein lies the problem: will it 
be directed towards the more complete develop-
ment of capital or towards solidarity, reciprocity, 
and direct democracy for producers? 
Caution must be used in underlining this 
point. It is not merely a question of choosing 
between statism and control, on the one hand, or 
the freedom of the market and of profit-making 
on the other. The advocates of the second alter-
native depict it as being the only real way of 
safeguarding democracy against the danger of 
statist totalitarianism represented by the first 
option. This is a false dichotomy, however. In 
the final analysis, the other path leads to the 
same thing, to vertical corporate structures 
which can and do compete with the State, but 
which are invariably closely linked to it. The 
private/State dichtomy is no more than a dis-
tinction between two components of the same 
instrumental rationale, whose ascendancy has 
ended up by producing an extremely protracted 
crisis and the present situation of disorder and 
confusion. 
Capitalist statism and privatism are actually 
the Scylla and Charybdis of the navigators of 
contemporary history. We need not choose 
between them or fear them. Today, the ship of 
the liberating rationale is propelled forward by 
the fresh winds of a new hope. 
